Book Review: A Tale of Two city states
By Michael Cole from Taipei Times
Book: Politics and Change in Singapore and Hong Kong: Containing Contention by Stephan Ortmann
It has often been said that democracy is not endemic to Asia, or that its development is inevitably stunted by so-called “Asian values” or “Chinese characteristics.” Opponents of this view, meanwhile, argue that modernization leads to democratization as an increasing number of groups and individuals are empowered and therefore become more prone to challenge the authorities. This has led to the belief — and hope — that modernity, oft-defined as the adoption of capitalism, will transform a state from within and initiate the process of democratization.
If this were the case then China, of all countries, would be expected to be the next country on the democracy waiting list. And yet, there are hardly any signs that it is about to do that. How do we explain this?
As “most similar cases,” two Asian city-states — Singapore and Hong Kong — allow us to experiment with the impact of modernity on post-colonial regimes with a tradition of “soft authoritarianism.” By following the emergence of contention alongside rapid economic development in the city-states and how the authorities responded to that challenge, we can establish whether democratization is a teleological phenomenon — in other words, that modernity/capitalism inevitably leads to democracy — or if other preconditions are necessary for this transformation to occur.
This is what Stephan Ortmann, assistant professor of comparative politics at Fern University in Hagen, Germany, undertakes in Politics and Change in Singapore and Hong Kong. To this end, Ortmann presents a detailed analysis of the ruling elites in Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as the oppositional groups that have challenged their authority.
The author shows us that “soft authoritarian” regimes depend on performance for their legitimacy. Their ability to deliver on their promises (stability, security, economic growth), therefore, is directly related to the emergence of oppositional groups and their capacity to challenge the authorities. It quickly emerges that while the Singaporean elite has been largely successful in implementing its policies, Hong Kong authorities fared much worse. Public housing, among others, is discussed to compare the outcome of similar projects in the two city-states. Given its performance, Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) was able to cultivate the belief that the stability of the state — its very survival, in fact — depends on the party.
The fact that the PAP was a direct descendent of post-colonialism, whereas the Hong Kong authorities in the 1970s — the period of interest here — were British colonial and manned mostly by foreigners, also had an impact on perceptions of legitimacy.
Beyond this, the strategies used by the ruling elite can be simplified to two approaches: co-optation and coercion. The section of the book that explores these two is by far the most fascinating, especially when it comes to Singapore.
Co-optation was an instrument used by both one-party city-states to prevent the emergence of strong oppositional groups by bringing them into government and thereby institutionalizing the opposition. Invariably, however, oppositionists were limited in their ability to climb the hierarchy and were relegated to consultative (as opposed to partisan) bodies with very little ability to influence policymaking. What little elections were held were usually for such positions, which while not threatening the ruling elite nevertheless gave it a veneer of democracy.
By Ortmann’s account, Singapore was much more successful than Hong Kong in using co-optation to pre-empt the opposition. In fact, it went to great lengths to give the public a stake in the survival of the PAP: Social engineering (quotas on ethnicity within districts, a “multiracial state”), extremely high rates of employment within the public sector and large government-linked corporations are all part of this strategy.
Coercion, for its part, includes a variety of techniques, from surveillance of oppositionist groups to assembly laws, censorship of the media to defamation lawsuits. In that regard, Singapore has also been far more successful than Hong Kong, so much so that to this day oppositionists are afraid of speaking out for fear of its impact on their jobs and the high likelihood that doing so will result in a ruinous lawsuit. The portrayal by the PAP of oppositionists as “extremists” and “troublemakers” has weakened the image of dissidents with the public and compelled many to play by the rules by joining the system rather than fighting it from outside. This explains why Hong Kong, which didn’t treat oppositionists as harshly, saw far more non-institutionalized techniques of opposition, such as mass rallies, during its tumultuous years.
Control of the media also plays a large role. While publications in Hong Kong were generally free, the situation is quite different in Singapore. Consequently, when the PAP fails to meet public expectations, the media will come to its defense and blame the shortcomings on some external factor or by singling out a few scapegoats. Lack of reporting on such incidents, or reporting that paints the authorities in a favorable light, therefore, has a substantial impact on public perceptions of the ruling elite. In Hong Kong, when the government fumbled, the media were able to report on it, which helped de-legitimize the elite and created opportunities for oppositionist groups.
Ortmann wraps up with possible scenarios for Hong Kong and Singapore, conclusions that are far from optimistic.
While Hong Kong, which was far less successful in delivering on its promises as a paternalistic state and only reluctantly used coercion to constrain oppositionists, liberalized and, to a certain extent, democratized from the late 1970s until retrocession in 1997, Ortmann raises questions about the viability of democracy in the special administrative region, mostly because of the increasingly influence of Beijing in local politics.
As for Singapore, while acknowledging the role of the Internet, which the PAP has not censored as much as it has other media, and the party’s limited attractiveness for Singaporean youth, the author does not see much hope for democratization, unless a severe shock, such as the global economic crisis, undermines once and for all the legitimacy of the elite. Given that Singapore appears to have emerged relatively unscathed from the crisis, that prospect once again looks distant.
While not addressing this explicitly, through his exploration of the techniques by which “soft authoritarian” regimes managed to stay in power, Ortmann shows us how certain parties in democratic states — and here Taiwan comes to mind — could deconstruct those achievements and push the country back in the other direction toward soft authoritarianism. – Taipei Times
Book Review – The Fajar Generation: Merger and the Decimation of the Left Wing in Singapore (Part 2)
By Tan Jing Quee, co-author of The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the politics on postwar Malaya and Singapore
(An excerpt of Mr Tan’s article from page 263 to 297, republished here with the kind permission of Mr Tan so that more Singaporeans are able to know about the history of their nation from untainted glasses)
THE 1959 CONSTITUTION
The 1959 constitution for the state of Singapore is a misnomer. Nominally called a state, Singapore’s political status at that time was that of a colony in law and infact, despite the ingenious installation of a fully-elected legislative assembly. However, the sovereignty of the state remained with the United Kingdom and it was anticipated that the final advance to full statehoold and sovereignty would have to be negotiated in yet another round of constitutional talks scheduled for 1963.
The new government under the constitution was formed in June 1959. At the apex of the state structure was the constitutional head of state known as the Yang di-Pertuan Negara. The first incumbent was the British governor at the time, Sir William Goode, subsequently followed by the first local head of state, Yusof Ishak.
The constitution provided for a unicameral legislature, known as the legislative assembly, which would be fully elected and comprise 51 members. It also specifically provided that the naval base at Sembawang would remain under the control of the British.
This constitution did not grant full independence or even full internal self-government to Singapore, as the fully elected legislature did not have the power or authority over matters affecting defence, foreign affairs or internal security.
The creation of the tripartite Internal Security Council (ISC) purportedly representated a partial concession on the part of the British government.
As matters trned out, the ISC provided a convenient cover for tripartite collaboration to deal with the opposition in Singapore as events in the next few years would reveal.
The report entitled “The outlook of Singapore up to the end of 1960″ (in Appendix to C.O.S. (59)237, CO 1030/656) is an interesting document with which to begin an understanding of British policy towards the new state of Singapore.
It clearly note that the British and the “moderate” leadership of the People’s Action Party (PAP) regarded the left-wing group led by Lim Chin Siong as a potential threat but one that they could handle with all the armory at hand.
Lee Kuan Yew was quoted as anticipating a conflict with the left wing of the PAP within a year. It also records Lee’s intention to reorganize the labor movement into one general federation and 30 other fedderations or unions for each particular trade, together with the reorganization of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) secretariat, to control any potential threat from the left-wing trade unions.
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The document also contains a revealing insight into the thinking of the PAP’s “moderate” leadership in the early days of the formation of the government under the 1959 constitution.
It states that “it was notable that at the first meeting of the Internal Security Council (ISC) on 28th August, Lee gave a very full and frank explanation of his approach to the problem of Lim Chin Siong’s activities and other threats to security which impressed all present.”
This was just about three months from the PAP victory at the May 1959 general elections. It was obvious that a fundamental consensus had been reached between the British and PAP governments that the principal concern for the next phase of constitutional development before 1963 would be how to manage, control and if possible, eliminate the left-wing movement from Singapore political life.
There is no mention of any PAP programme to continue with the anti-colonial struggle. Almost from the beginning of the PAP’s assumption of power, the bilateral consensus would be turned into a tripartite agreement (including the Malayan government) on an anti-communist campaign under the cover of a closer association of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the three Borneo states.
The anti-communist crusade would soon replacce the anti-colonial struggle as the fundamental driving force in the regional political context.
As Singapore’s last colonial governor under the new constitution, Sir William Goode wryly observed to his superior just before he left his post:
“To regard the present PAP leaders as crypto-Communists would be an entire mistake. To describe them as crypto-anti-Communists would be much nearer the mark.” (Goode to Secretary of State for Colonies, CO 1030/652, 23 November 1959).
Related articles:
>> Temasek Review to kick-start political education for Singaporeans
>> Interview with Dr Poh Soo Kai in Chinese by Merdeka Review
>> Photo Gallery: Book launch of “The Fajar Generation”
>> Interview with Dr Lim Hock Siew and Dr Poh Soo Kai
>> Dr Lim Hock Siew on “immorality” of the political situation in Singapore today
>> VIDEO: Dr Lim Hock Siew speaks of his detention
>> Book launch: The Fajar Generation
EDITORS’ NOTE:
“The Fajar Generation” is published by GB Gerakbudaya Enterprise Sdn. Bhd:
11 Lorong 11/4E, 46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia.
Tel: +603-7957 8342/8343 Fax: +603-79549202
Email: sird@streamyx.com or gerakbudaya@pd.jaring.my
Website: www.gerakbudaya.com
Book Review – The Fajar Generation: Merger and the Decimation of the Left Wing in Singapore (Part 1)
By Tan Jing Quee, co-author of The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the politics on postwar Malaya and Singapore
(An excerpt of Mr Tan’s article from page 263 to 297, republished here with the kind permission of Mr Tan so that more Singaporeans are able to know about the history of their nation from untainted glasses)
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we have assembled a selection of documents relating to Singapore’s political developments from 1959 until the establishment of Malaysia in 1963. These documents are taken from the UK National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) at Kew after they were released into the public domain.
Although their release is well-known to scholars and students of history not many of them have made the effort to access these documents (which are voluminous) to understand the background of events relating to the history of Singapore between 1959 until it joined Malaysia.
Though this essay refers to only a selection of the available documents we believe that those referred to are representative enough to give a balanced and coherent view of these developments.
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It is ironic that we have to resort to the colonial papers in the London archives to sort out the underlying story and perhaps to understand the essential truth behind the headlines.
It is pertinent to note that the archive materials, though useful in providing the contemporary accounts from the perspective of the colonial officials regarding the actions and motivations of the principal actors of the period, do not by themselves constitute the full story of what actually transpired during the period.
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For now, then, the reliance on the materials at the National Archives in London may have some value until new resources become available.
Some scholars have enthusiastically relied on these documents – which they consider to be contemporaneous and objective – to form the basis for their reconstruction of the events of the period. They fail to bear in mind the limitations of the material.
It should be remembered that these archival documents consist of correspondence, opinions and statements drafted by the colonial officals on site, for the purpose of permitting the Colonial Office in London to understand the local developments. These views and opinions should be taken to be their input into policymaking.
Policies were in fact decided on by the colonial secretary and the cabinet in London, and sometimes were not fully explained or set out and made known to the local officials.
A good example is the issue of mass arrests mounted to ensure the smooth implementation of the formation of Malaysia.
The documents indicate clearly that these officials were trying to inform the Colonial Office of a number of things:
1. The left-wing movement in Singapore had no connection with the communist underground and did not receive instructions from them.
2. There was no evidence that the movement was organizing any violent campaign to frustrate Malaysia.
3. It was not receiving instructions from Beijing or Moscow.
4. Lim Chin Siong was even thinking in terms of carrying out a constitutional struggle for a socialist Malaysia after merger.
If these views had been accepted in total by the colonial secretary or the British cabinet there would have been no basis to mount any arrests to remove the entire left-wing leadership in Singapore and to cripple all the organizations.
The fact that the Colonial Office eventually took a long-term “strategic” decision to mount Operation Cold Store in 1963 – organized jointly with the governments of Malaya and Singapore – indicates quite clearly that a distinction must be made between the facts as the colonial officials on the scene saw them and the actual policy decisions made in London.
Related articles:
>> Temasek Review to kick-start political education for Singaporeans
>> Interview with Dr Poh Soo Kai in Chinese by Merdeka Review
>> Photo Gallery: Book launch of “The Fajar Generation”
>> Interview with Dr Lim Hock Siew and Dr Poh Soo Kai
>> Dr Lim Hock Siew on “immorality” of the political situation in Singapore today
>> VIDEO: Dr Lim Hock Siew speaks of his detention
>> Book launch: The Fajar Generation
EDITORS’ NOTE:
“The Fajar Generation” is published by GB Gerakbudaya Enterprise Sdn. Bhd:
11 Lorong 11/4E, 46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia.
Tel: +603-7957 8342/8343 Fax: +603-79549202
Email: sird@streamyx.com or gerakbudaya@pd.jaring.my
Website: www.gerakbudaya.com
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