Our bloated defence budget: A swift and decisive victory
April 12th, 2009 | 
Author: By Gunslinger, Guest Columnist
The need for deterrence against potential aggressors is indisputable for this city state. In fact, there is a very strong case for deterrence and there is historical precedence that small states in the correct context with the right capabilities can achieve this. During World War 2, land locked Switzerland avoided Nazi Germany’s invasion through its difficult mountainous terrain, its citizen army, sheer grit and pride and without doubt a little complicity.
Yet, it would be interesting to see how the SAF might attempt to achieve a swift and decisive victory should deterrence fail. A military victory is usually defined as meeting military objectives that would fulfil political objectives. Thus, we would need to estimate what might be the SAF’s military objectives.
For this, Tim Huxley’s “Defending the Lion City” is revealing. Singapore’s leaders evidently believe that the best defence is offence and this is reflected in the order of battle of the SAF: amphibious landing ship tanks; heavy troop lift helicopters; F-16s and F-15s with conformal fuel tanks (increased striking range), the latter being F-15E Strike Eagles on steroids; air refuelling tankers; main battle tanks etc. The concept of “forward defence” described by Tim Huxley is therefore quite apt. With such offensive and power projection capabilities, she is probably more keen on punishing an aggressor, hitting where it really hurts and causing some long term damage rather than just beating off an attack.
This concept becomes even more credible when the nature of the national service is considered. Previously two and a half years of service for most young men, it was shortened a few years ago to two years. However, this should be considered a very lengthy period for a country outside a war zone or hot spot. Taiwan has only a 1 year conscription period and are considering a fully professional military force by 2014. Furthermore, the conscripts are not only trained in basic warfare but probably go through at least one exercise at the brigade or even divisional level.
On the MINDEF website, you would find information on overseas training exercises such as Wallaby in Australia resembling major combat operations. With emphasis on combined arms and integrated air force army operations, it is not unfathomable that the SAF’s defensive doctrine involve invading an aggressor. After all, Singapore’s urban areas are hardly the best places to run divisional level combined arms, with air force support.
The necessity of a short and brutal war is obviously not lost on Singapore’s Ivy League leaders. This is reflected in the SAF’s mission, doctrine and composition. It is unlikely that the SAF would or could persecute a protracted war. After all, mobilising her entire reserve forces would grind her economy to an abrupt halt. The composition of the RSAF’s offensive capabilities is also probably scaled to inflict maximum damage in the shortest time possible.
Geopolitics have immense influence in this region where one of the world’s most important shipping lanes passes through. Today, an estimated 80% and 90% of China’s and Japan’s energy supplies respectively pass through the Malacca Straits. Singapore is also a vital port and transit point for American forces between the Indian and Pacific oceans. Any armed conflict will certainly invite “international” condemnation, swift economic sanctions, international pressure and even military intervention.
MINDEF constantly reminds the Singapore public (through their website) about the British failure to defend Singapore during WW2, and that the SAF is the only guarantor for security. While there is some truth in it, they also conveniently avoid mentioning that Singapore would probably have been a much easier target without the British. They also forget to add that all countries will dash headlong to protect their own vital interests. The international community will not allow the Malacca straits to be turned into a war zone as too much is at stake for them. International action against piracy at the Horn of Africa and Japanese proactive participation in keeping the Malacca straits free of pirates are further proof. Numerous factors converge to limit the scale of a armed conflict that would threaten trade through the Malacca Straits.
Using Israel’s latest experience in Gaza and in Lebanon in 2006, the SAF would have no more than about 3 weeks to 1 month to achieve her objectives before being forced to the negotiating table for a ceasefire. This is an optimistic estimate given that Singapore does not have much leverage over the major powers nor does she have the powerful congressional lobbies that Israel possesses and uses to great effect.
Given the need to achieve a “swift and decisive victory” in this short time frame, the SAF faces a nearly impossible task although this article does not intend to cast doubt on her doubtlessly impressive operational capabilities. In fact, we shall assume that the SAF would face little opposition in a conventional face off with the Malaysia armed forces.
Yet, the ultra urbanisation of Singapore and to a lesser extent southern Johor poses immense problems to any invading army. Civilian casualties and collateral damage are almost impossible to avoid, resulting in loss of legitimacy and increased pressure to end hostilities. Case in point, the Israelis had to stop their operations in Lebanon in 2006 due to international pressure although they had international support at the beginning of the war.
Armies also advance at a snail’s pace in urban areas. The Pakistani army took more than 6 months to rout the Taliban in the tribal controlled areas which are dotted with little villages, unlike the dense cities in Singapore and southern Johor. In the process, they also had to bulldoze most of the villages. The SAF is therefore faced with a quagmire : avoid the urban zones and risk artillery and rocket attacks fired from these areas or enter the zones and fight protracted bloody battles.
Neither option is pretty. While the attacks may not do serious physical damage, the psychological damage could be severe, demonstrating the inefficacy of the SAF in defending against primitive rocket or artillery attacks. So in fact, the SAF would be forced to enter these zones to attempt to control them and stop the attacks. However, the recent Israeli wars have shown that it is impossible to stop them, despite the fact that the Israelis possessed one of the most effective armies in the world as well as the most technologically advanced weaponry available. They fared better recently in Gaza but at immense cost in terms of collateral damage and legitimacy of their cause. The ensuing international outrage is now threatening their trade status with the European Union.
A conventional conflict also assumes that both parties are intent on pitting their conventional forces against each other. An opponent can choose to prolong the conflict while preserving her forces. Such a strategy will bear down on Singapore’s weaknesses, wearing down her forces and economy while rallying for a strategic attack at the right time.
This strategy (not tactic) is in fact employed throughout the world by terrorist organisations. The Malaysian armed forces already appears to understand the concept of preserving forces, placing her most valued military assets out of easy reach from Singapore. Their newest Sukhoi-30MKM will be based in northern West Malaysia, yet they still have the range to strike the city state. Their new state of the art Scorpene submarines will be based in Sepanggar Bay in Sabah.
Even in the unlikely case where Singapore does achieve a “swift and decisive victory”, the effects of a war will have far greater and longer lasting effects on her than on any of her neighbours even after a cease fire. Wanting to avenge themselves, an intelligent adversary will bleed Singapore slowly to economic disaster with occasional skirmishes and plenty of rhetoric.
Without a hinterland or natural resources, she will be forced to look further afield to import her daily needs. The increased cost of doing business would drive away investors. Local SMEs already deprived of an adequate domestic market will be put out of business. Increased security measures needed to guard against ex-enemies will strain resources. In this context, war is not the best way to bring down Singapore. Bleeding her to death would be much easier and cheaper. This has not yet happened because it is much more profitable to cooperate with her.
This does not mean that Singapore is not defendable. It is certainly defendable. As an island, invading forces need to possess a significant amphibious or bridging capability since trying to dash the causeway or the second link, which might be blown up, under fire is suicidal.
The urban environment is a huge booby trap and makes it difficult for an invader to control the terrain and progress quickly to key objectives. These are “natural” obstacles that are extremely difficult to overcome even without significant participation of armed resistance. But this article is long enough, and I will present an alternative defence policy later and an alternative NS policy. For now, it suffice to say that MINDEF’s policies are misguided, do not take into account today’s realities and will not bring “swift and decisive victory”. Taxpayer’s money has been wasted in pursuing this current defence strategy and our youths do not need to go through a 2 year NS period.
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I wonder if you’re also a fan of pointer journals. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals.html (free of course)
A lot of the points that you touched on in your article are discussed in that journal.
Since the people up in higher management in SAF are all scholars, you expect them to regard their published articles quite seriously.
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If you ask me, the cure to all these petty squabbles and wars is a good old fashioned “alien invasion of earth” scenario to happen.
Yr last sentence is a huge statement. Sounds like a cheap & good proposition, abit like geylang durian seller. Hmmm… monies wasted by current strategy, and wait… even no need for NS. Wow.. if it sounds too good to be true, it may really be too good to be true.
Wah… Darth Vader… your Defence Policy must need alot of Jedi power or “Force”… Haha. Must vote you into Jedi Council and realise “world peace”… or rather “inter-galactic peace”.
PS: Any fantasy military headhunting you to be consultant, yet?! Must have patience… maybe Yoda’s on the line…
I’ll agree on the budget. But definitely not the removing or shortening of 2 years of NS.
2 years of NS is about just the right amount of time to make sure any Tom Dick and Harry get used to the army’s system and ensure proper enforcement of protocols asap when the need arises. Within the 2 years troopers are made to attend courses, EX and trainings which furtermore implants basic field knowledge, and make sure when the need arises people know what their job is and what to do to survive.
You shorten NS, and you get yourself stricter rules to make sure people serve it properly. Not only that, there’d be even more trouble to deal with when less time is given for troops to integrate with the system. Handing taking over will appear too often, ORD moods comes so ever quickly, and when that happens even daily functions, which depends heavily on NSFs will go wrong when no one takes it seriously.
And as for Urban Environment being an advantage to us, you’re only partially right. For if any armed forces with enough artillary power and reserve can easily level us in our home turf, of course as been said we probably won’t be fighting in our home turf anyways. And our airbases aren’t really located in urban areas anyways, making it much easier to take out our planes than we think.
But any kind of shit can happen during war, so I’m not too interested in projecting it.
To Darth Vader,
Looking at Georgia (Russia’s invasion last year) and East Timor in the 1970s… no country will sacrifice their soldiers and money unless there is something to be gained .. to defend another country.
What is your alternative defence strategy then for Singapore to what you have written?
My grandfather lived thru the Japanese 3 years of hell during Syonan-To, I thus believe that should Singapore have to use arms, absolutely everyone of us want it to be successful… for simple reason of survival.
I think 2 years is too long.
It is a waste of our manpower.
Given that there are so many poor families who count on their son’s contribution, 2 years delay is way too long. How else do you expect them to help themselves? I know of so many awol cases where people had to run to make some money to make ends meet.
All the more when, we have such a long reservist training period! It is making Singaporeans much less competitive than the foreigners.
If you factor in the firepower we had acquired, we don’t need that many people doing the same thing over and over again.
It is a sheer waste of time and resources.
It is not only costing a lot in terms of manpower, and time, it is also making us a lot less competitive than the foreigners.
It is also unfair to have us sacrifice to defend Singapore while foreigners are reaping on the security that we provided.
We should have invested into simplifying the operations.
Besides, it fails to take into account the state of the neighboring countries’ weakness.
They cannot launch a full fledge attack just like that. They are not operationally ready as some mindef studies that were rammed at us, suggest.
It is more economical for them to launch a small target attack in our keys infrastructures. The likelihood of their success is higher too. How do we know that the fires are not set up by their people.
We should also invest into infrastructures that ensures that we get to keep those attackers locked up when we catch them. We cannot afford to have a Mas Selmat again. He is probably boasting to his people about the weakness of our system. That would make them more daring.
Have mindef or MOHome affairs help us prepare for that ?
And it costs these attackers very little, while Mindef is costing us a lot.
I don’t think 2 years is sensible. There has to be a more intelligent use of time while keeping the final security objective met. The current state is not ideal and it is also unfair.
I like your article.
NS in Singapore works by bringing down costs of manpower while the bulk of the defense budget is used to purchase “high end” weapons from western countries.
NS is here to stay in Singapore.
You can either suck thumb or vote in a majority opposition to rewrite the constitution. Note that there is no guarantee that opposition parties will do anything to cut off NS.
I think one simple solution is to declare Singapore as nuclear-capable within 3 days. We need not stock nuclear weapons but we can have the know-how to build one with 3 days. Any hostile countries will be nuked if they don’t destroy us within 3 days.
Of course, this will encourage a nuclear South east asia but honestly, who can say for sure that SEA will stay nuclear-free in the future?
as much as everyone dislike it, strong defence is a must that cannot be compromised, much like education……this article is not fantastic……
Does anybody know how did Japan managed to conquer Singapore so quickly in World War 2? Japan attacked on 8 Feb 1942 and Singapore surrendered 15 Feb 1942, correct?
LaChlan:
Which country now has the capability, resources and determination to launch a similar offensive like the Japanese did?
They could cause more harm using terrorist techniques than the Japanese technique.
Are we ready for that?
We cannot even protect ourselves against uncooked food.
Spend too much on Singapore defense. Waste money and time. When war comes, everyone dies. That is for sure. Singapore so small, even we strike first, how many enemy be killed before we get exhausted ? The only solution is to get some devastating rocket or nuclear bomb.
Spend too much on Singapore defense. Waste money and time. When war comes, everyone dies. That is for sure. Singapore so small, even we strike first, how many enemy be killed before we get exhausted ? The only solution is to get some devastating rocket or nuclear bomb.
What we know is what they tell us, and what we hear. But what do we really know? What actual figures or facts do we really know? can we really defend singapore? maybe we are being prepped to “think” that we can and so we ‘tell the world’ we can. But its probably all a facade. How much information can you really get to support the fact that We Can/Cannot Defend Singapore?
I will defend Singapore when it comes, no choice. My home leh.
Gunslinger, this is an interesting article and I must say I enjoyed reading it very much.
Here are a few points I’ll like to make.
(1) About the British, it’s definitely true that Singapore would have been a much easier target if not for the British forces. However, I think the argument is not so much about the ability to defend, but the will to defend. To the British, Singapore was merely another part of their money-making machine. It was not everything to them and so, when the crunch comes, they will flee and give up. But it’s a different case when you have your own people defending their country. For me, this is my home, and this is where my family is and I will do anything to protect them, should Singapore ever fall into war. This is what it means to say that the SAF is the only guarantor of security. It’s about us… “if we ourselves do not defend this land, then nobody would”. I remember a quote like that, but can’t remember who said it.
(2) National Service. Yes, it is a pain, and should be shortened if possible, however, not at the expense of decreased ability to fight. I shudder at the thought of MINDEF succumbing to public pressure and reducing national service drastically and then when the crunch comes, we have flabby NSmen who have no stamina to charge up hills and can’t remember how to operate the complex war machinery. In a real war, every small mistake can come at a big cost. So I believe MINDEF shouldn’t do away with National Service and ICTs, but find ways to make it more efficient and “operationally ready” 24/7. You’ll know you’re there when NSmen stop complaining about the “wait to rush, rush to wait” syndrome.
(3) “Can we do with a professional armed force?” In my opinion, this depends on how much of a deterrence we can create out of a professional armed force. Size is one problem. Imagine if we stopped national service. How big a professional army can the SAF attract? Imagine we need to fight. Will our adversaries laugh at us and say “ha ha… ikan bilis”? Being so small, it seems near impossible to build a large enough armed force that is an effective deterrence unless we opt for national service. However, one possibility is for technology to make up for the lack of numbers. If technology can make one soldier perform as effectively as say a hundred, then perhaps we can downsize and go for a professional military instead. But then again, if we can leverage technology, so can our enemies. We’ll end up in an arms war where size again will matter.
(4) “It’s not likely that we would go to war. So why have the SAF?” This is what some people think. If Singapore goes to war, sure lose, so why even bother to prepare for such an eventuality? I think this train of thought leads to nothing but failure. A lot of people fail to understand that this is all about a mind game. The build up of hardware is just to support the mind game and give it credibility. We need to project an image of a strong SAF, so nobody would mess with us. It gives our political leaders more room to negotiate for Singapore’s interests when they’re out there talking trade. Think of it in a business sense. It’s all about who needs who more. If we are strong in a military sense, we can drive a harder bargain cos’ we can always turn away when a deal doesn’t meet our expectations. But imagine if we were weak and had no decent military… All our neighbours have to do is mention cutting water supply or some other threat and oooh… we would succumb. Everything Singapore is doing is to strengthen our position in the international playing field and the same goes for defence. Why do we go out and make friends with the big military boys (ie: USA)? Well, simple… we want to make strong friends with those who can back us up in times of trouble. Would you mess with Singapore if you know USA and many other countries would sit up and watch (esp when they have vested interests in the country)? I think this is the crux of the “diplomacy and deterrence” policy MINDEF has on their website.
This is what I have to say.
I’m looking forward to reading your next article.
to Lachlan: s’pore was conquered easily because the british were cowards. plain and simple. it was the local malay regiment that put up a heroic defence. can’t recall about the aussies and kiwis.
this article was a wasted 5 min of my life. gunslinger should have gone straight into his/her alternative NS policy. this article does nothing except create political tension with our northern neighbours.
singapore is not defendable against modern artillery (they can just lob shells blindly at us beyond effective range) and MLR systems given our density. collateral damage will be high for any conflict that is not fought on foreign soil.
Dear Gunslinger,
For the record I’ve done my NS and reservis duties. I esp. hate going back for reservist. Having spent enough time (wasted) in camp, there are many things I think are wrong with the SAF, but I think you are pointing your gun at the wrong target.
It is quite apparent to me that if deterrence fails, our defence policy failed – period, because if we go to war, we are always going to be the losers.
To advertise that we can achieve “swift and decisive” victory, is precisely a big and very loud advertisement – and precisely for the purpose of strategic deterrence. Whether we can achieve that in “reality” is another matter.
Therefore I disagree with you suggest: that the doctrine is entirely wrong simply because our forces are likely to be bogged down in Johor and it can’t prevent irregular aggressors from lobbing shells at us.
Furthermore you go on to say that the island is naturally defensible…
Pardon me, are you suggesting that if it comes down to the crunch, we can always hold an aggressor off by doing FIBUA around Causeway Point Shopping Center or Jurong Point?
I sincerely hope your alternative defense strategy doesn’t involve turning our densely populated HDB towns into defensive strongpoints. After all, this isn’t Counterstrike… I have real friends and relatives who live in places like Woodlands, you know! Furthermore, unlike the Soviets in WW2 who could shift their industrial base to Siberia, and then could afford to turn Stalingrad into a battleground to bog down the Nazis, in case you haven’t noticed – we only have one city, with all 100% of our population and 100% of our GDP.
Besides, coming back to your first point about strategic deterrence – A potential aggressor doesn’t neccessarily have to invade us. It is so easy to destabilize us – If they can easily mobilize an army of 100,000 to JB, we would already be big losers, without a single shot fired. Our stock market will crash, investors will flee in panic. Everyone will be booking the next plane ticket out. (Remember one particular year near our national day when a neighbouring country held large scale exercises near our borders?)
Today, that hasn’t happened precisely because any aggressor knows that if they were to make any move to shift their war-making chess-pieces in place, whether they are serious or just want to “play-play”, possibly, just possibly, our F15s would have already swung into action. No doubt we would still be the losers in the end, but can they also afford the high cost just to make us losers? So just that psychological capability alone, is not to be taken lightly.
Nevertheless, I look forward to your second piece.
so is ‘Gunslinger’, an ex Armed Forces General or military operations expert?
” ……….. But this article is long enough, and I will present an alternative defence policy later and an alternative NS policy. For now, it suffice to say that MINDEF’s policies are misguided, do not take into account today’s realities and will not bring “swift and decisive victory”. “
Gunslinger,
What’s your vocation during your NSF?
What level of SAF exercises have you participated in?
You know what happened to Kuwait on 2 Aug 1990?
We dont have ‘Saudi Arabia’ or ‘Bahrain’ to escape to.
A ORNS Spec said before [or similar words],
” You don’t own what you can’t defend.”
Gunslinger, your article is so similar to those articles published in SAF Pointer magazine, Defending The Lion City by Tim Huxley and articles published in defence magazine like MILTECH, ADJ, JDW etc.
Gunslinger – If you can help to train a NSF Battalion in less than 2 years, decrease the defence budget, turn around “MINDEF’s misguided policies” etc etc and maintain SAF’s operational readinees; i think DPM Teo has a job for you.
1. A lot of people say that a conscript army is not motivated enough to fight. I think we can give ourselves more hope and more credit. If we see our loved ones or treasured possessions taken away by an aggressor, I believe we will fight.
2. A lot of people say we have a smaller population than our neighbours and so we can’t win a war. But in war, the general population does not fight. Only the military fights. Population size is irrelevant.
3. NS, regardless whether it is too long or too short, or necessary or not, is a great way of building nationhood and fostering a common identity with everyone else I live with. I like how NS brings me friends from all walks of life, the rich and the poor, the university graduates and the non-educated, different races, citizens and PRs – most of whom I would never have met, befriended and understood without NS.
4. The criticism that the SAF has offensive elements perplexes me. As a soccer player, I can’t imagine just defending and defending without having any offensive threat. Sooner or later you’d break. This is, in fact, the terrorist problem the world faces today. Everyone keeps defending; no one knows where and how to attack the source of the threats.
5. Whether the defence budget is too much or not is debatable. But if I am a rich parent, and richer than other parents, I would make sure I spend as much money as I need on my children so that they will have all it takes to become the strongest and fittest in school. I can spend the money on buying a bigger house, a nicer car, or on other investments, but it is a risk I would rather not take.
6. Finally, I wish to say that I don’t understand the logic of the article, as summarised in the final paragraph. The author went to great lengths to argue that there are natural obstacles to defending Singapore that are extremely difficult to overcome. But, instead of concluding that MORE resources and LONGER NS are therefore needed to equip the SAF to overcome these obstacles, it concluded that we are wasting taxpayer’s money and the time of our youths. The only way such a conclusion can be reached is if the author feels that all efforts to defend Singapore are futile, and hence, all resources committed are pointless. This suggests we might as well give up. It is a conclusion as a Singaporean I refuse to accept.
To all, I appreciate all comments even if those that are not so polite.
I will not discuss the 2 year NS or professional army now. Suffice to say that I am totally for NS, even for women (I won’t talk about that though), but for much shorter focused periods. Too difficult to elaborate now.
@randonmindeness, I agree that deterrence is paramount. But we must prepare for when deterrence fail. History has shown that war is a human phenomenon, and humans are irrational, that’s why most of us (including me) buy high and sell low on the stockmarket…sigh
@wakeUp, thank you for your points. I agree that there might be an issue of will, but there was also a lack of means. We were not just their golden goose, but prized golden goose (after India). “SAF is the gurantor…”is right from MINDEF website. I think rather that SAF is the last line of defence. If the US decides to crush us, the SAF can guarantee nothing.
“Would you mess with Singapore if you know USA and many other countries would sit up and watch (esp when they have vested interests in the country)? I think this is the crux of the “diplomacy and deterrence” policy MINDEF has on their website.” – I agree with you and this is what I was talking about in Part 1.
@riccai, I will have to decline questions on my background. It is not that we don’t defend Singapore. It is the “How” that I am alluding to. I went to great lengths to show that a land offensive is eventually futile.
@boboshooter, my point precisely: it is so easy to destabilise us. But it has not happened because it is better to keep us around then to destabilise or destroy us. It hurts them as much as us. But again history has shown that economic interdependence does not prevent wars. Off the cuff, I can’t remember when and where but it has occurred before.
@Physsion, Singapore is defensible. In a total war (like WW2), population size matters and I did end by saying that Sg is highly defensible. If Sg was playing Brazil, would you put 6 players as strikers?
oGunslinger,
A writer’s qualifications n creditentials lends to his credibility when writing an article, especially on specialised topics.
What u mention below, about ‘USA crushing us’, speaks for itself.
“@wakeUp, thank you for your points. I agree that there might be an issue of will, but there was also a lack of means. We were not just their golden goose, but prized golden goose (after India). “SAF is the gurantor…”is right from MINDEF website. I think rather that SAF is the last line of defence.
If the US decides to crush us, the SAF can guarantee nothing.”
Hi gunslinger again,
Just looking at the follow up to your “Our bloated defence budget” follow up article. I made some comments on your earlier article and I appreciate your reply. The subject of NS brings out strong feelings in Singaporeans and I emphatise with them. It is a great sacrifice to basically put your life on hold for two years to defend your nation, and we are not even talking about going to war yet.
I would like to expand on what I touched on in reaction to your earlier article. First up, what are the threats to Singapore?
Currently, there is no real threat to Singapore. It is, however, an unwritten fact that the most “likely” enemy that Singapore will face is Malaysia. The historical baggage both share and geographical proximity makes it the highest probability that the two countries will come into conflict.
At the core of this “schism” is the Malay/Chinese issue. Let us not try to avoid this reality. The creation of Singapore as an independent state came about from the fact that the Malaysian body politic could not go on with a Singapore controlled by a Chinese-majority party which wanted equal rights for all Malaysians. To develop this point further, there are also some groups in Malaysia who feel that Singapore was “lost” to the British through Sir Stamford Raffles and later to the Chinese through Lee Kuan Yew. The chances of a political party or any leader with such “right wing” ideas coming to power in Malaysia are, however, very remote. I do not think there is popular support for something like that. I think, just as the politics of accommodation continue to thrive in Malaysia, both in the ruling National Front and the opposition grouping, this will and continues to be reflected in the country’s foreign policy.
There is also the fear of an Islamist party taking over the reins in Malaysia but I feel that sometimes, the fear of anything Islamic has been overplayed by the western media. Not all Muslims are like the Taliban and Malaysian Muslims are one of the most tolerant in the world.
There have been examples of quarrelling neighbours learning to live together whether they like it or not. There is Turkey and Greece and by extension, Cyprus. There is Taiwan/China. There is even North and South Korea. So, at the end of the day, Singapore’s AND Malaysia’s first line of defence should be through diplomacy. And diplomacy must be treated as if it is the ONLY form of defence because a war between the two must be thought of as unthinkable. Unfortunately, sometimes, the unthinkable can occur.
And can the SAF win a “A swift decisive victory” against Malaysia with the current order of battle, or even with future assets in place.
Again, like my previous reply, I say a conditional “NO”, especially with the current assets on both sides. But let’s just say, for the sake of argument that Singapore has taken delivery of all 24 F15SGs it ordered. And let us not throw the F35 Lighting into the fray as the aircraft is still some way off from even USAF/Navy/Marine Corps service, let alone the RSAF’s.
The RSAF’s combat assets will most probably look like this:
F15SG 24
F16C/D Block 52+ 60+
F5E Tiger II 40+
AH64D Apache Longbow 20
Now let us look at the SAF’s ground forces:
Leopard 2A4 MBTs 90+
Centurion with 105mm gun 60 (stored? retired?)
AMX13SM1 350
AMX10 40+?
M113 APCs/IFVs 1,000+
Bionix IFVs 800??
Bronco APCs/mortar carriers 400+??
Primus SP Artillery 50+??
Towed or self-powered 155mm guns 100+??
Himaars rocket artillery 5??
(will not include guns at 105mm or below)
AND
Malaysia’s Airforce:
Sukhoi 30 MKM 18
Mig 29N 14
F/A-18C/D 8
Hawk 200 14?
MB339 12?
F5E Tiger II 14?
Malaysia’s ground forces:
PT91 MBT 44
Scorpion light tanks 24
Alvis Stormer light armoured vehicles 25
Sibmas with 90mm gun 180+
Adnan/KIFV APC/IFVs 240+?
Condor APCs 450+?
155mm towed artillery 30+
Astros MLRS 36
(will not include guns at 105mm or below)
I will not go into the nations’ naval forces as I feel they will only come into play if the conflict becomes protracted.
Let us take this hypothetical situation where a “rogue” government in Johor decided to turn off the water taps to Singapore and the republic decides to take punitive action.
The first targets will obviously be airbases in West Malaysia, especially those housing the Sukhoi 30 MKMs in Kedah, the MiG 29s in Kelantan and F/A-18s in Butterworth. Chances are, the RSAF will not be able to nail all of them on the ground as some of these aircraft like the F/A-18s are based in Sabah, Sarawak or Labuan.
The thing is, even if a small number of any of these assets survive, they will always be able to contest any effort by the RSAF to gain air superiority in the Peninsula. But things will also be very difficult for the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) as any surviving units will have to operate from destroyed or damaged airbases and they might also be caught on the ground while refuelling or rearming. Also, there will be many more RSAF jets roaming the sky than them by then.
And there is also the other very important factor of the Malaysian Army’s artillery, both guns and rockets — all of the RSAF’s air bases are well within their range. So, another objective of the RSAF will be to eliminate as much of this as possible in the first hours of the war. The thing is, more than a surviving RMAF, the Malaysian Army’s artillery represents a greater threat to the RSAF’s airbases. There is no way the RSAF will be able to get rid of EVERY 155mm/105mm gun or multiple-launched rocket system quickly enough and they will therefore be able to disrupt air operations in any of the RSAF’s bases. This may the reason why the RSAF practices air operations in Singapore’s highways just in case the runways get cratered. One way for the SAF to beat this is to push as far as possible into the Peninsula as quickly as possible so that RSAF bases will be beyond Malaysian artillery range.
We must therefore ask: How much can the RSAF degrade the RMAF and Malaysian Army in the early part of any conflict? How disruptive will Malaysian artillery be on air operations in RSAF bases? And, also, how good is the SAF artillery’s counter battery fire to complement the RSAF’s efforts. Plus, what are the RSAF’s losses after the initial stages of such a conflict?
Of course, while all this is happening, the Malaysian Army will not be sitting idly by. With the RSAF busy trying to knock out as much of the RMAF as possible while trying to hunt down artillery and rocket units, I am quite sure much of the Malaysian Army would have remained intact. And, please do not assume that the RSAF’s AH-64D Apache helicopters will have a field day even though it has a superb combat record in both the Gulf Wars and in Palestine. Even though the more “visible” Jernas SAM system would most probably be taken out by the RSAF early on, the Malaysian Army still has many man portable systems like the Starburst, Anza and Igla. They number in the “hundreds” and will be a very real and credible threat the to Apaches. I think losses to the Apaches will be heavy.
So, SAF ground units cannot assume that the Apache will be able to take care of destroying Malaysian ground or armoured units. The SAF’s ground forces will have to do the bulk of the job themselves, I feel.
And Malaysian armoured and mechanised units are quite formidable. Yes, the Polish PT91 MBT is impressive and 44 of them will cause quite a headache. But let us not forget the Sibmas fire support vehicle with the 90mm gun. There are still about more then 150 in Malaysia’s arsenal. The SAF has more than 90 of the outstanding Leopard 2A4 MBT. It beats anything Malaysia has, even the PT91, but that force will be stretched thin. The vehicle the SAF has in numbers is the old AMX13SM1 (350 units) but I feel that the Sibmas is the superior vehicle here. However, we must not forget the SAF’s Guards units with their LSVs armed with Spike ATGMs. Or maybe, bring the old but still capable Centurion out of storage?
So, the crux of the matter here is that the SAF will not just “walk over” in the fight against Malaysia.